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V.-S- THE STATE OF UT^H 
AL •".;. RIGTRUP. A. MAkK : 
PETERSEN, BUD J. SHEPHERD, 
and LEON ZEEMAN, d/b/a : 
LAKE SHORE EGG RANCH, a 
partnership, : 
Plaintiffs-Appellants ; 
vs. : 
STRAW3ERRY WATER USERS : Case \o . 1^675 
ASSOCIATION, -! :; -l mv-
n o r * z \ h " '""•"• ^  5 
Defendant-Respondent. 
NATURE 0^ T:'!- ""'? ~" 
This :i s a:- action for damages arising out of -; power 
: •- -.j v;n±c-i caused the suffocation oi approximately 
000 chicken1- P lai n^ if: ^ s o'!a"i =1 a mages aaainr— -"he 
agreement, negligence, breach or warranty, strict lability, 
DISPOSITION :N ai£ LOWER COURT 
Thf- case was tried t.- <ury -n April ''•••' V»forp 
i .1 it;:;; L~x\ , JMJ.'* / i. i,i.i i ,..i <',,:;;;.« » <i »-'>i. « /.»,. ( i. i - i ' * L i i \, / x ,„ir » • j *\ „i i. i i n i; i i j ii" j 'i i \ j; i c ' i l il n » 
the trial was bifurcated, and only the issue of liabili ty 
\ ? a s t r i a d . ; , .' , / f • .' • * v ;.'••'•' '•' "• '• • '••" " '"'' ' ' •" '' '• ' .;'• • f \:; 
Prior to trial, the court dismissed Plaintiffs1 causes 
of act ion on breach or agreement, Hrearh of warranty of 
f i t i l e s s , s I . i:i t u r ai id 1:1: :i i r d - p a r t y 
beneficiary, leaving only the ISSUO of negligence for trial. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The jury returned a special verdict under comparative negligence, 
attributing ten percent (10%) of the negligence to the defen-
dant, and ninety percent (90%) of the negligence to the plain-
tiffs. (R.22-23)• Judgment on the special verdict was entered 
by the court on the 12th day of April, 1976, in favor of the 
defendant and against the plaintiffs, no cause of action.(R. 17-
21). Plaintiffs subsequently made a motion for a new trial 
alleging that the evidence was insufficient to justify the 
findings in the Special Verdict, the court erred as a matter 
of law in submitting a jury instruction and interrogatory on 
assumption of risk, the court erred in failing to give certain 
instructions requested by the plaintiffs and erred in giving 
the instructions that it gave, the court erred in refusing 
to admit certain regulations of the Public Service Commission 
as evidence of the duty of the defendant, the court erred in 
granting summary judgment to the defendants and striking 
plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action, and the court erred in 
dismissing the First, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh causes of action 
of plaintiffs complaint. (R. 15-16). The court denied Plain-
tiff motion for a new trial. (R. 11-14). Plaintiffs appeal 
from the decision of the Trial Court, 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants submit that the trial court erred as a matter 
of law and seek a remand of the case for a new trial, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are for information purposes only, 
inasmuch as the appellants contend that the Court erred as a 
matter of law. 
4 
TD-a/r^ O 
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Mr. Al. G. Rigtrup and his three sons-in-law, Mark Petersen, 
Bud Shepherd and Leon Zeeman, operate several poultry related 
businesses in the Lake Shore, Utah area. (Lake Shore, Utah is 
approximately four miles west of Spanish Fork, Utah.) 
In the fall of 1972, the plaintiffs commenced an expansion 
program which was designated as the Lake Shore Egg Ranch and 
which was ultimately to include several coops and a processing 
plant. Anticipating the need for proper electricity, the appel-
lants arranged with the respondent for the supply of electricity 
to the newly constructed coops. A constant and sufficient supply 
of electricity is needed since large numbers of chickens in close 
proximity generate great amounts of heat which require large fans 
to cool and circulate air thereby maintaining a controlled en-
vironment. 
Construction of the first coop began in the fall of 1972 
and was completed in December of 1972. The coop housed approx-
imately 30,000 laying hens. 
To supply electricity for construction, the respondent ex-
tended an existing 12 0 volt single-phase power line to the site. 
The line was connected to plaintiffs' coops through a weatherhead, 
standpipe, meter base and switch box (referred to as a "service" 
in the electrical industry) furnished by the plaintiffs. 
In the spring of 1973, appellants commenced construction of 
a second coop at the same site. On April 1, 1973, after an 
unusually heavy snow storm, the roof of the first coop collapsed, 
killing several thousand chickens and effectively terminating the 
operation. Appellants continued to build the second coop, sal-
vaging material from the first and eventually completed the 
second coop in June of 1973. Appellants then commenced re-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
construction of the first coop which was completed in July 
Of 1973. Laying chickens were then placed in both coops with 
total number being approximately 60,000. 
On July 1, 1973, there occurred some difficulty with the 
breaker box which was evidently due to the characteristic of 
aluminum wire to flow under pressure which loosened the wire 
I 
and caused a short. Respondent arrived at the scene after a 
call and repaired the damage. 
Because of the added power draw due to the increase in 
electrically operated equipment, the respondent changed a 
10 KVA transformer near the coop site to a 15 KVA and eventually 
to a 25 KVA transformer. Even with the 25 KVA transformer, the ^ 
appellants often were drawing the maximum power load available. 
On August 9, 1973, at approximately 6:00 p.m., a power 
outage occurred at the coop site, which caused the suffocation ^ 
of approximately 4 0,000 laying hens. The outage was apparently 
caused by a burn out in the wire between the transformer and 
weather head on the stand pipe or actually in the stand pipe * 
itself. 
The respondent and its agents apparently knew that the 
wire in the stand pipe and meter base was inadequate and so g 
advised an electrician employed by the appellants and possibly 
one of the appellants themselves. 
Appellants had installed a stand-by electrical generator f 
and engageing apparatus which was not connected at the time of 
the outage. 
The plaintiffs' contention was that the defendant had re- ( 
presented to the plaintiffs that 120-240 three phase power would 
be furnished to the coops by a certain date and that the elec-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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tricity was not furnished and that the plaintiffs had to then 
rely upon the makeshift temporary service in-lieu of connect-
ing the new service and auxiliary generating equipment. The 
defendants contention was that the plaintiffs knew that the 
temporary service was inadequate and that it made no promises 
to the plaintiffs to furnish any power by any certain date. 
As previously stated, the issues were tried to a jury on 
April 5-7, 1976, with several of the plaintiffs1 causes of 
action being dismissed, leaving only the issues of negligence 
to be tried. 
During the course of the trial the plaintiffs attempted 
to introduce into evidence certain Rules and Regulations of the 
Public Service Commission of the State of Utah, but the evidence 
was excluded upon the sustaining of the defendant's objection. 
(R. 127-133). 
Another issue causing much dispute during the trial was 
the applicability of the doctrine of Assumption of Risk. At 
the close of plaintiffs1 case, the defendant moved the court 
for a dismissal on assumption of risk, and the plaintiffs 
responded, arguing that it would be error to instruct on 
assumption of risk under Utah's comparative negligence law. 
(R. 113-127). 
It is appellants' position that the trial court erred as 
a matter of law in instructing on assumption of risk in a com-
parative negligence case, erred in failing to admit the Rules 
and Regulations of the Public Service Commission and erred in 
failing to grant plaintiffs1 motion for a new trial. 
Page 5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT I 
THE DEFENSE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK IS INVALID AND NOT 
AVAILABLE TO THE RESPONDENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The advent of comparative negligence, either by statute 
or by judicial decision, has caused great confusion in the 
minds of commentators and courts as to the applicability of 
doctrines which were formally associated with contributory 
negligence. One of those doctrines is assumption of risk. 
The Utah Legislature, in adopting the comparative negligence 
statute, apparently considered the impact that comparative 
negligence would have upon assumption of risk and specifically 
spoke to that issue in the statute; 
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery 
in an action by any person or his legal represen-
tative to recover damages for negligence or gross 
negligence resulting in death or in injury to per-
son or property, if such negligence was not as 
great as the negligence or gross negligence of the 
person against whom recovery is sought, but any 
damages allowed shall be diminished in the pro-
portion to the amount of negligence attributable to 
the person recovering. As used in this act, "con-
tributory negligence" includes "assumption of the 
risk." Utah Code Ann., 1953, Section 78-27-37(1973). 
Utah has no clear judicial precedent abolishing assumption 
of risk as a separate defense, 1 nor has this Court inter-
preted the "assumption of the risk" aspect of the comparative 
negligence law, and consequently, some confusion has arisen. 
xThe following states have judicially abolished the 
affirmative defense of assumption of risk: California, 
Li vs. Yellow Cab Company of California, 119 Cal.Rptr, 858, 
532 P.2d 1226(1975); Hawaii, Bulatao vs. Kauai Motors, Ltd., 
49 Haw. 1,406 P.2d 887 (1965); Idaho, Fawcett vs. Irby, 92 
Idaho 48, 436 P.2d 714 (1968); New Hampshire, Bolduc vs. 
Grain, 104 N.H. 163, 181 A.2d 641 (1962); New Jersey, 
Meistrich vs. Caseno Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 
A.2d 90 (1959); Wyoming, Ford Motor Company vs. Arquello, 382 
P.2d 886 (Wyo.1963) . Other courts expressing disfavor with the 
Page 6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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At the close of the presentation of evidence in the 
present'case, the defendant made a motion to dismiss the case 
on the grounds that as a matter of law the plaintiffs had 
assumed the risk of the power outage. (R. 113-127). The 
trial judge expressed his confusion on the assumption of risk 
and questioned whether the doctrine was a separate doctrine or 
had merged into the comparative negligence statute. (R. 115). 
After extensive argument on both sides, the court ruled that 
it was going to instruct the jury on assumption of risk. The 
plaintiff again objected on the ground that assumption of risk 
does not apply in a comparative negligence case. (R. 119). 
The court eventually decided to instruct upon assumption 
of risk and did so. Instructions numbered 12, 13, and 14 
(R. 57, 58, 59) specifically apply to assumption of risk. In 
addition, Interrogatory number 6 of the special verdict re-
quired the jury to find whether plaintiffs had assumed the risk 
of the power outage. (R.23, 50). It is plaintiffs position 
that any instruction on assumption of risk, in light of the 
comparative negligence statute, is error as a matter of law 
inasmuch as the statute specifically includes assumption of 
risk in comparative negligence. 
doctrine of assumption of risk are Hale vs. O'Neill, 492 P.2d 
101 (Alaska 1971); Frelick vs. Homeopathic Hospital Ass, of 
Delaware, 51 Del 568, 150 A2d 17 (1959); Parker vs. Redden, 421 
SW2d 586 (KY.App. 1967); Baltimore County vs. State, 323 Md. 
350, 193 A2d 30 (1963); Feigner vs. Anderson, 375 Mich. 23, 
133 N.W.2d 136 (1965); Ritter vs. Beals, 225 Ore. 504, 358 
P.2d 1080 (1961); Siragusa vs. Swedish Hospital, 60 Wash.2d 310, 
373 P.2d 767 (196T3T Those states abolishing assumption of 
risk as a separate defense under comparative negligence are 
Connecticut, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah. 
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4 
To properly determine whether assumption of risk should 
survive as a defense under comparative negligence, the nature M 
of assumption of risk must first be analyzed. 
An ititial problem is that the term "assumption of risk" 
has been used by scholars and courts to describe a variety of | 
legal concepts. In addition, various doctrines such as "volenti 
non fit injuria11 and "no duty" have become intermeshed with 
assumption of risk. | 
The defense of assumption of risk has basically taken two 
forms, express assumption of risk and implied assumption of risk. 
Express assumption of risk is where a party expressly | 
agrees in advance to waive any claim for liability for the con-
sequences of conduct that the law might other wise view as 
negligent. Implied assumption of risk is where the plaintiff 4 
voluntarily decides to take his chances when he knows that 
there may be some possible negligent conduct on the part of 
the defendant. A third category of assumption of risk is.some- 4 
times recognized where the plaintiff is aware of the negligent 
act already done by the defendant and nevertheless proceeds 
voluntarily to encounter it. Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th 4 
Edition, p. 440, explains the three theories as follows: 
In its simplest and primary sense, assump-
tion of risk means that the plaintiff, in ad-
vance, has given his consent to relieve the de- 4 
fendarit of an obligation of conduct toward 
him, and to take his chances of injury from 
a known risk arising from what the defendant 
is to do or leave undone. The situation is 
then the same as where the plaintiff consents 
to the infliction of what would otherwise be ' 
an intentional tort, except that the consent 
is to run the risk of unintended injury, to 
Page 8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
take a chance, rather than a matter of the 
greater certainty of intended harm. The result . 
is that the defendant is relieved of all legal 
duty to the plaintiff; and being under no duty 
he cannot be charged with negligence. 
A second, and closely related situation, 
is where the plaintiff voluntarily enters into 
some relation with the defendant, with knowl-
edge that the defendant will not protect him 
against risk. He may then be regarded as 
tacitly or impliedly consenting to negligence, 
and agreeing to take his own chances. Thus 
he may accept employment, knowing that he is 
expected to work with a dangerous horse; or a 
ride in a car with knowledge that the brakes 
are defective and the driver incompetent; or 
he may enter a baseball park, sit in an un-
screened seat, and so consent that the players 
may proceed with the game without taking any 
precautions to protect him from being hit by 
the ball. Again the legal result is that the 
defendant is simply relieved of the duty which 
would otherwise exist. 
In the third type of situation the plaintiff, 
aware of a risk already created by the negli-
gence of the defendant, proceeds voluntarily 
to encounter it-as where he has been supplied 
with a chattel which he knows to be unsafe, and 
proceeds to use it after he has discovered the 
danger. If this is a voluntary choice, it may 
be found that he has accepted the situation, and 
consented to relieve the defendant of his duty. 
For an additional discussion of the various types of 
assumption of risk see Schwartz, Comparative Negligence, 
p. 153, Chapter 9. 
In discussing the doctrine of assumption of risk, this 
Court has apparently made a distinction between contractual 
assumption of risk and implied, or voluntary assumption of 
risk. 
Calhan y. Wood, 24 Utah2d 8, 465 P.2d 169 (1970); 
Foster v. Steed, 23 Utah2d 148, 459 P,2d 1021 (1969); Hindmarsh 
v. O. P. Skaggs Foodliner, 21 Utah2d 413, 446 P.2d 410 (1968); 
Ferguson v. Jongsma, 10 Utah2d 179, 350 P.2d 404 (1960); Johnson 
Page 9 
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i 
v. Maynard, 9 Utah2d 268, 342 P.2d 884 (1959); Clay v, 
Dunford, 121 Utah 177, 239 P.2d 1075 (1952); Taylor v. 
Bamberger Electric Co,, 62 Utah 552, 220 P. 695 (1923); 
Kuchenmeister v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co., 52 Utah 116, 
172 P. 725 (1918) . 
This Court has, however, indicated on several occasions 
that assumption of risk can merge into contributory negligence. 
Johnson v. Maynard, supra. 
The doctrine of assumption of risk is but a specialized 
aspect of the defense of contributory negligence. Heindmarsh 
vs. Skaggs Foodliner, supra. 
Professor Schwartz in his treatise, Comparative Negligence, 
supra, discusses the Utah comparative negligence statute and 
points to the confusion that exists. 
The key section of the Utah Statute is almost 
identical with that of Idaho except that there is 
added to the Utah Statute a sentence defining "con-
tributory negligence" to include assumption of the 
risk. There had been some question in Utah as to 
whether implied assumption of risk was a part of 
contributory negligence or was a separate defense. 
The definition was apparently added to make it clear-
er that applied assumption of risk is subject to 
comparison under the statute. It is questionable whether 
expressed assumption of risk is subject to comparison 
or remains as a separate and complete defense. 
Heft and Heft, Comparative Negligence Manual (1971), 
1976 Cumulative Supplement, page 9, states: 
Under Utah law, assumption of risk, like any 
other form of contributory negligence, is aportioned 
under Utah's comparative negligence statute. Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 78-27-37. 
It is obvious that the commentators agree that under 
Utah law, implied or ordinary assumption of risk is to be 
considered as contributory negligence on the part of the 
plaintiff and is to be weighed in the verdict on comparative 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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negligence. Plaintiff submits that the Utah statute, if 
carefully read, is also clear on that point. Consequently, in 
the case in which there is no evidence of an express contract 
to assume a risk, there is no need to instruct an assumption 
of risk as it is included in the process of comparing the 
negligence of the parties. Any instruction on assumption of 
risk would be duplicitous. In fact,it was upon that very 
basis that the plaintiffs objected to the instructions on 
assumption of risk given by the court: 
My further objection to the assumption of 
risk instruction is that it weights, it adds undue 
balance to the question of contributory negligence 
and adds an additional negligence factor to the 
question of comparative negligence that would other-
wise be in a comparative negligence case. Further-
more, that the question of assumption of risk is 
incompatable with a comparative negligence issue 
and that the Court should never give instructions 
concerning comparative negligence and assumption of 
risk in the same group of instructions. (R. 135-136). . 
Respondent has argued and undoubtedly will argue that even if 
it was error for the trial court to give the instructions on 
assumption of risk, that such error was not prejudicial. 
In countering plaintiffs1 argument during the hearing 
on the motion for a new trial, the defendant argued that the 
giving of instructions on assumption of risk could not have 
been error because the question on assumption of risk on the 
verdict form came only after the jury had answered the ques-
tions on negligence. (R. 144-145). Plaintiff however submits 
that it was error since instruction no. 4, given by the Court, 
was a pre-statement of the special verdict form. The jury 
encountered the question on assumption of risk before it ever 
Page 11 
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began to answer the special verdict. (R. 49-50). Also, 
before the jury was required to answer the special verdict 
on assumption of risk, it undoubtedly had considered in-
structions No. 12, 13, and 14 on assumption of risk given 
by the Court. In addition, the special verdict form does 
not require the jury to answer the questions on negligence 
before answering the question on assumption of risk. The 
jury may have answered questions No. 6 first and then gone 
back and answered the other questions. 
Appellants submit that it was error in law to instruct 
the jury on the issue of assumption of risk, and that such 
instruction and the question on the special verdict form on 
assumption of risk prejudiced the appellants and therefore 
the cause should be remanded for a new trial governed by the 
comparative negligence statute. Appellants are entitled to 
have a jury consider their case which is properly instructed 
under the recently adopted comparative law of Utah. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADMIT EXHIBIT 33 AND 
IN REFUSING TO GIVE PLAINTIFFS1 REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS. 
During the course of trial the plaintiffs requested the 
Court to admit a copy of certain rules and regulations of the 
Public Service Commission governing an electric utility 
company. (Exhibit 33). The Court heard argument on the ad-
missibility but eventually rejected the exhibit. (R. 127-134). 
At the close of trial the plaintiffs requested the 
Court to instruct the jury on the applicable rules of the 
Public Service Commission. (R. 172-174). The Court refused 
to give the instructions to the jury and specifically re-
fused the instruction incorporating Public Utility Regulation 
A67-05-31:ll. (R. ..174). Appellants contend the Court 
erred in refusing to admit Exhibit 33 (Public Utilities 
Regulations) and in refusing to give plaintiffs' requested 
instructions. 
In 1971, the Legislature of the State of Utah adopted 
legislation which made it clear that Utah would require 
certain minimum standards for electrical installations. The 
legislation was introduced as House Bill number 203 and 
when finally passed, carried the following caption: 
"MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR ELECTRICAL INSTALLATIONS. 
An Act Relating to Electrical Installations and Eq-
uipment; Providing for the Creation of Minimum Stan-
dards for Installations of Electrical Equipment With-
in the State of Utah; and Providing Certain Exemptions 
from the Standards Established." (Laws of Utah, 1971, 
Chapter 167) 
When the act was finally codified, it was put under the 
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section entitled "Electricians" and became Utah Code 
Annotated, §58-36-20 through 23. 
The relevent portions of §58-36-21 state as follows: 
"58-36-21 Safety requirements and applicable 
standards for installations of electrical 
equipment.—(1) All installations of electrical 
equipment shall be reasonable safe to persons 
and property and in conformity with the 
applicable statutes of the State of Utah, and 
all applicable ordinances, orders, rules and 
regulations of any political subdivisions 
of the State of Utah which are not in conflict 
with this act. 
As used in this act, 'reasonably safe to 
persons and property1 as applied to electrical 
installations and electrical equipment means 
safe to use in the service for which the 
installations or equipment is intended without 
unnecessary hazard to life, limb or property* 
(2) Conformity of installations of electrical 
equipment with the applicable regulations set forth 
in the 1968 edition of the National Electrical Code, 
the National Electrical Safety Code, or other 
safety codes which have been approved by the 
United States of America Standards Institute shall 
be prima facia evidence that such installations are 
reasonably safe to persons and property." (emphasis 
added.) 
The foregoing statute was apparently an outgrowth 
of regulations which had existed in the State of Utah for 
several years. In 194 0 the Public Service Commission for 
the State of Utah adopted rules and regulations pertaining 
to electrical installations and equipment used thereon. 
Rule 11 of those rules and regulations provides in part 
as follows: 
II. General Requirements — 
a. Unless otherwise directed by the Comission, 
the requirements contained in the latest edition of 
the National Electrical Safety Code, issued by the 
National Bureau of Standards, shall be the minimum 
requirement relative to: (1) the installation and 
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maintenance of electrical supply stations; (2) 
the installation and maintenance of overhead and 
underground electrical supply and communication 
lines; (3) the installation and maintenance of 
electric utilization equipment; and (4) rules to 
be observed in the operation of electrical equip-
ment and lines. Existing ungrounded low-potential 
circuits shall be grounded in conformity with the 
requirements of the National Electrical Safety Code 
by January 1, 1940. 
* * * 
f. No utility shall furnish electric service 
to any applicant until satisfied that the wiring 
and utilization equipment to be served have been 
inspected and passed by the controlling public 
inspection and authority. Should an electric utility 
either before or after connecting a customer dis-
cover defective electric wiring or defective equip-
ment in service, or discover electric wiring or equip-
ment service which causes undue interference with the 
service rendered other customers, it shall immediately 
report the same to the Commission and should it be 
notified in writing by this Commission or by city or 
county authorities that consumers1 wiring or electrical 
is defective, or causes undue interference with the 
service rendered other customers, it shall immediately 
discontinue electrical service for use through such 
wires or in such equipment, unless special permission 
is otherwise given by this Commission to continue such 
service. 
g. Each electric utility shall, upon request, 
give its customers such information and assistance as is 
reasonable, in order that its customers may secure safe 
and efficient service, and upon request it shall ren-
der every reasonable assistance in securing appliances 
properly adapted and adjusted to the service furnished. 
Public Utility Regulation A67-05-31:11. 
Appellants submit that the foregoing rules and regulat-
ions evidence a standard of care that a Public Utility 
Company is required to exercise. Part of that standard of 
care is not to furnish electrical power to a customer's 
facilities when it knows that those facilities are inadequate* 
u the present case there is no dispute that the respondent 
knew that the "service" of the appellants was insufficient 
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4 
to carry the added burden placed upon it by the changing 
of the transformers and was insufficient to allow the 
appellants to continue to draw the amounts of power that 
they were using through the system without a failure* 
Appellants submit, therefore, that the foregoing rules and 
4 
regulations of the Public Service Commission evidence that 
degree of care required by the respondent. 
The modern trend of the law is to allow such safety 
4 
codes or standards or rules and regulations into evidence on 
the issue of negligence. 58 ALR3d 148, Annotation: Ad-
missibility in Evidence, On Issue of Negligence, of Codes 
4 
or Standards of Safety Issued or Sponsored by Govermental 
Body or by Voluntary Association. Utah appears to be among 
those jurisdictions allowing the use of such safety standards* 
I 
In Wheeler v. Jones, 19 Utah2d 392, 431 P2d 985 (1967), this 
Court allowed safety standards on sliding glass doors to be 
admitted, stating: 
I 
"It will be noted that the Court did not 
say that it was the standard of the community— 
rather, he seemed to imply that it was one of the 
standards of the community in determining whether 
or not the defendants were negligent. 
We think the testimony was proper to show 
the knowledge of the danger involved and how 
extensive that information had become." 
In the present case the Public Service Commission Rules 
and Regulations should have been admitted to allow the jury 
to consider them as evidence of the standard of care in 
light of knowledge by the respondent that the system was -
inadequate. It was, therefore, error by the trial court to 
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refuse to so instruct the jury and to reject Exhibit 33. 
Since the jury was not instructed as t the applicable 
standard of care, appellants submit that the proper remedy 
is to remand the case for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Instructing the jury on assumption of risk by the trial 
court unfairly prejudiced the appellants and weighted the 
verdict in favor of the defendant and the failure of the 
Court to properly instruct the jury on the standard of care 
required by the Public Service Commission Rules and Regulat-
ions precluded the jury from fairly deciding the negligence 
of the parties. For these reasons, the Court also erred in 
denying appellants1 motion for a new trial. 
Appellants respectfully request the Court to remand the 
case for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Jackson Howard, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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I, Marianne Peterson, certify that I mailed a copy 
of the foregoing Brief to Reed L. Martineau, Attorney for 
Defendant-Respondent, 701 Continental Bank Building, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84101 and to Dave McMullin
 r .Jo-Counsel 
for Defendant-Respondent, 20 East Utah Avenue, Payson, Utah 
84651, this / f^ day of October, 1976. 
r 
lYiaJLLMWU , HktlAAA^j 
Secretary 
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